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VIOLENCE IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS: IS IT
PART OF THE GAME?
Richard B. Horro w *
Excessive violence in professional sports has received significant at-
tention recently in the legal community and in American society at
large.' This problem involves criminal acts which maim, even kill ath-
letes during athletic competition, yet go wholly unpunished by the legal
system. As one prosecutor in a sports violence case stated, "The mere
act of putting on a uniform and entering the sports arena should not
serve as a license to engafe in behavior which would constitute a crime
if committed elsewhere." Yet the problem increases with each passing
year. In the 1974 National Football League season, 1,638 players
missed two or more games with "serious injuries" (approximately
twelve injuries for every ten players, 3 a twenty-five per cent increase
over the previous season) and studies have revealed that football is so
physically debilitating that a professional football player's life span is
significantly shorter than that of most males. 4 "Each year sports in
America cause over 17 million injuries that require medical attention.
Over one million high school football players . . . and 70,000 college
football players . . . are injured annually." Furthermore, "from 1933
to 1976, organized football claimed the lives of 1,198 partici-
pants. . . ."I Basketball players throw elbows, baseball pitchers knock
down batters and base-runners slide into bases with their spikes flail-
ing. Excessive violence is an issue even in non-contact sports. As ath-
letes become more competitive, and as the pressure to succeed becomes
stronger, the possibility of violent conduct during the game increases.'
One aspect of the problem concerns the relationship of the civil and
criminal law to sports violence, as evidenced by an increasing number
* Executive Director, Dade County [Florida] Sports Authority; Chairman, American Bar As-
sociation Task Force on Sports Violence. B.S., Northwestern University, 1976; J.D. Harvard
University 1979. Andrew Rogness, Journal of Legislation staff member, served as research
assistant for this article.
1. Seven sports articles are listed in the 1964-1967 INDEX To LEGAL PERIODICALS, compared to
fifty-one in the 1973-1976 INDEX,. and seventy-five in the 1976-1979 INDEX.
2. Flakne and Caplan, Sports Violence and the Prosecution, 13 TRIAL 33, 35 (Jan., 1977). Mr.
Flakne, County Attorney for Hennepin County, Minnesota, prosecuted one of the more fa-
mous sports violence cases, State v. Forbes, No. 63280 (Minn. Dist. Ct., 4th Jud. Dist.,judg-
ment ofmistrial entered, Aug. 12, 1975).
3. Hofeld,.4thletes-Their Rights and Correlative Duties, 19 TIAL LAW. GUIDE 383, 402 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Hofeld].
4. Id. at 401.
5. Peterson & Scott, The Role ofthe Lawyer on the Playing Field, 7 BARRISTER 10 (Summer
1980).
6. R. HORROW, SPORTS VIOLENCE: THE INTERACTION BETWEEN PRIVATE LAW MAKING AND
THE CRIMINAL LAW 2 (1980).
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of sports violence cases reaching the courts. This article7 examines the
causes of excessive violence in sports, discusses the inability of the
sports establishment to deal with the problem, analyzes the legal ele-
ments of battery and relevant defenses and explores proposals for judi-
cial and legislative resolution of sports violence cases.
THE PROBLEM:
EXCESSIVE VIOLENCE WILL CONTINUE TO INCREASE
AS LONG AS THE PRESSURES AND
INCENTIVES TO BE VIOLENT
REMAIN
Most people in the sports establishment agree that some degree of
violent contact is a necessary part of any contact sport. The issue be-
comes acute when these people view excessive violence as an appropri-
ate, necessary, even encouraged part of the game. In hockey, excessive
violence and intimidation are becoming integral parts of strategy.8
Players fight because it has become a condition of the job. Noted
sports attorney, Bob Woolf, explains: "The premium the National
Hockey League puts on this aspect of the game was reestablished every
time I talked with a team on behalf of a draft choice. Invariably, the
interview would get around to how well my client could fight."9 For-
mer NHL President Clarence Campbell has admitted that pressure
from teammates and fans forces many players to stand their ground
and fight or risk being branded as cowards.'"
The professional sports leagues have developed, in essence, its own
"criminal common law." Violent conduct is tolerated by the league as
part of the game. Excessive violence that exceeds the peculiar common
law standards of the game is dealt with by the league, and an effort is
made to keep it out of the court system." The intense competition of
professional sports encourages violent conduct. League officials and
players accept the fact that some less talented players use violence to
compensate for inferior ability.'" Winning is the hallmark of success
and the means used to achieve victory become less scrutinized. In foot-
ball, competition against teammates for roster positions and against op-
ponents for victory fosters a mentality of survival of the fittest. In
testimony during the Hackbart case, former coaches John Ralston of
the Denver Broncos and Paul Brown of the Cincinnati Bengals admit-
ted that it was normal practice to "disregard the safety of opposing
7. Based on surveys sent to 1,490 professional athletes, coaches, owners and prosecuting
attorneys.
8. Note. Tort Liabilityfor Players in Contact Sports, 45 U. Mo.-KAN. CITY L. REV. 119, 129
(1976).
9. B. WOOLF, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS 146 (1976). [hereinafter cited as WOOLF).
10. W. MCMURTRY, ONTARIO MINISTRY OF COMMUNITY AND SOCIAL SERVICES, INVESTIGA-
TION AND INQUIRY INTO VIOLENCE IN AMATEUR HOCKEY 24 (1974).
II. Confidential player survey (received by the author, February 21, 1979).
12. Smith, Social Determinants of Violence in Hockey. A Review, 4 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF AP-
PLIED SPORT SCIENCE 76. 79 (1979).
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players.""
The perception that violence is tolerated and necessary is coupled
with a catharsis justification: the speed, the body contact, and the very
nature of the game creates aggressive impulses and frustrations that
players must release. An occasional fight or late hit is actually healthy.
Of course, this justification has little merit. It appears, however, that a
majority of players believe it.' 4
Another contributing factor to the problem of sports violence is the
realization that violence is taught to and accepted by participants at an
early age. i5 As one commentator states,
Intentional injuries will continue to occur as long as high school play-
ers feel that they must demonstrate ability to play a -hard-nosed
game" in an effort to obtain a football scholarship to college: the same
holds true for college players who, in desiring to make a career in ath-
letics, emulate the professionals in hopes of being drafted.' 6
Once players learn the skills of violence, they are implicitly and explic-
itly pressured by teammates and coaches to continue their violent con-
duct.'" Studies have shown that if a coach asks his team to play rough
and aggressive, the players frequently translate the message into ap-.
proval of taking out the opposition any way they can.'" Another study
concluded that fifty-two percent of the surveyed twenty-one year-old
hockey players believed that their coaches highly approved of
fighting. 9
Media portrayal of violence in an attractive manner reinforces the
assumption that violence in sports is not criminal.2" The sports estab-
lishment and the media seem to believe that violence enhances the
marketability of professional sports. 2' The sports establishment and
the media are convinced the viewing public cannot appreciate the sub-
tle skill and finesse of talented players, but they can readily grasp the
concept of brawling.22 For example, when professional hockey' began
national network broadcasts in the early 1970's, the media attempted to
educate the public by demonstrating every conceivable type of foul de-
livered with great gusto and relish. A more constructive and educa-
tional approach would have been to show talented players exhibiting
real hockey skills in a non-violent context.
13. Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 435 F. Supp. 352, 356 (D. Colo. 1977). rerd'. ';I I 2.1
516 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied. 444 U.S. 931 (1979).
14. Smith, Towards an Explanation of locke' Violence. A Reference Other Approac/:. 4 ( x'.
DIAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY 105. 119 (1979).
15. McMurtry. supra note 10, at 26.
16. 7 AM. JUR. TRIALS 213, 237 (1964).
17. Comment, Consent Defense: Sports, Violence, and the Criminal Law, 13 AMI RI N ( IM!-
NAL LAW REVIEW 235. 245 (1975).
18. Vaz, What Price Victory? An Analysis of Minor Hocker League Plavers" .4lftuds lo ard
Winning, 9 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF SPORT SOCIOLOiY 33, 49 (1974).
19. Smith, supra note 12, at 78.
20. B. CONACHER, HOCKEY IN CANADA: THE WAY IT IS 119 (1970).
21. Hechter, The Criminal Law and Violence in Sports, 19 CRIM. L.Q. 425. 42 19"77
22. Conacher, supra note 20, at 119.
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The above factors have nurtured the problem of excessive violence
in professional sports. The problem, however, is not insoluble. The
following arguments might convince the coaches and owners to reduce
their zeal for violence.
First, if violence were productive at the gate, it must be measured
against the money paid in compensation to injured players. During the
1973-74 NFL season, for example, injured players received an esti-
mated $17,600,000 in compensation.23 Second, it would appear that
players would prefer less violence. Forty-five percent of the surveyed
hockey players preferred "less fist fighting in the games. ''2 4 William
McMurtry, a Toronto attorney commissioned by the Canadian Minis-
try of Community and Social Services, discovered that without excep-
tion, Canadian players who had competed in games governed by less
violent international rules indicated that those games were more re-
warding experiences.25 Third, if the hockey establishment continues to
encourage violence and intimidation to the detriment of skill, it is likely
that every other nation will surpass the United States and Canada in
actual hockey skill. The 6-0 humiliation of Team NHL by the Soviet
All-Stars in the final game of the 1979 Challenge Cup may have en-
forced this argument; and the realization that the same Soviet team
could lose to a group of American Olympic amateurs using finesse
rather than fisticuffs may have enforced it even further.
Sports attorney Bob Woolf and others agree, contrary to manage-
ment perceptions, that violence is not crucial to the box office.26 Over
the years, one of the least provocative NHL teams has been the Mon-
treal Canadiens. Yet they have endured as the best gate attraction in
the game. Former San Diego Gulls General Manager Max McNab
conducted a fan survey which revealed that fans listed skill and reflex
action, not violence and brutality as the prime reason for returning to
see a second game.
If these arguments persuade the sports establishment to alter its vio-
lence-oriented mentality, significant changes can be effected. Initially,
changes in safety oriented rules would be easier to make. Penalties for
fighting could be increased by league officials, and an automatic sus-
pension, as in Olympic hockey, could be introduced so that players
could refuse to fight without losing face. Permitting players to partici-
pate in redrafting rules defining punishable conduct would increase
their respect for the new rules. Former All-Pro linebacker Nick Buon-
iconti noted that "players don't like the idea of some cheap-shot artist
shortening their careers."27 The system should also increase its empha-
sis on skill development at younger age levels. Mandatory certification
23. Hofeld, supra note 3. at 401.
24. Smith. supra note 12, at 80.
25. McMurtry. supra note 10 at 26-27.
26. WOOLF, supra note 9. at 147-48.
27. Interview with Nick Buoniconti (January 3. 1979). Mr. Buoniconti, a former Notre Dame
and Miami Dolphins star, now practices law in Miami. Florida.
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of coaches and holding them responsible for player actions would ex-
pand the purpose of amateur sports beyond that of training profes-
sonals. Finally, the media should begin to educate the public and
distinguish between subtle skills and overt illegal violence. Until the
leagues adopt these recommendations, however, the courts must stand
ready to intervene.
THE SPORTS ESTABLISHMENT CANNOT BE LEFT TO
SUPERVISE ITSELF
When excessive violence goes beyond what the sports establishment
will tolerate, the tendency of the sports establishment is to keep the
courts out and deal with such conduct through league procedures.
Because league members condone, accept, and, in fact, encourage most
of this conduct, internal regulation is questionable. Each league creates
its own common law: an informal decision is made as to tolerable and
intolerable conduct. The leagues enforce their peculiar common law
by internal mechanisms of fines and suspensions. Members of the
sports establishment maintain that internal disciplinary proceedings
adequately control players' behavior during games. It is asserted that
the leagues know their sports better than any court and if courts have
the power to litigate the games, Pandora's box will be opened and the
games will suffer.
29
The players seem to have adopted a similar attitude.30 The general
consensus is that players will not seek judicial resolution of a sports
violence case, in part, because the unwritten macho code prevents play-
ers from going to court to protect themselves. 3' While most players
who were interviewed adamantly denied there was any conspiracy to
prevent lawsuits, many players fear that court involvement "will hurt
their chances of getting ahead."32 The fear of being labelled as a "club-
house lawyer" is very real.3 3 Marginal players fear being cut or
shipped to the minors-"terminated for lack of sufficient skill" accord-
ing to the clause in the Standard Player Contract. 3' Because the aver-
28. Comment, Discipline in Professional Sports. The Needfor Player Protection, 60 GEO. L.J.
771, 772 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Disciplinel.
29. HORROW, supra note 6, at 43-44.
30. Confidential players' survey (received by the author on February 12, 1979).
31. Id.
32. Telephone interview with Sheila Brooks, National Football League Players Association Staff
Counsel, Washington, D.C. (November II, 1978).
33, B. PARRISH, THEY CALL IT A GAME 172 (1974).
34. The Standard National Football League Player Contract, Provision Six, reads as follows:
If in the opinion of the Head Coach the Player ... fails at any time during the
football seasons included in the term of this contract to demonstrate sufficient skill
and capacity to play professional football of the caliber required by the League and
by the Club, or if in the opinion of the Head Coach the Player's work or conduct in
the performance of this contract is unsatisfactory as compared with the work and
conduct of other members of the Club's squad of players, the Club shall have the
right to terminate this contract. ...
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age professional athlete negotiates a new contract every 1.9 years,35 a
number of players who were interviewed stressed the need to "keep
quiet around contract time."3" Although most managements vehe-
mently deny it, some players fear they will be blacklisted if they take a
claim outside the family. 37 Whether or not these threats are actually
used by owners, players perceive them as a possibility and will not risk
alienating the sports establishment by proceeding through the courts.
Finally, the intricacies and inconvenience of litigation act as disincen-
tives to legal settlement of such cases.3
While the sports establishment attempts to keep disputes within the
family, the family's "police force," the fine and suspension procedures,
bear the ultimate burden of determining what is excessively violent
conduct. In theory, each league has the power to mete out severe fines
and suspensions for violent conduct. The results, however, are all too
often inadequate. Small fines and short suspensions do not act as real
deterrents to such conduct. Given the nature of the offense and the
high income of the average professional athlete, the penalties are too
lenient." ' While a conviction in the outside world creates a harmful
sligma that affects future employment, in the world of professional
sports. a conviction by the league may bring a certain amount of out-
right respect.4 ' Even if the fines were severe enough to deter violent
conduct, some players responding to the survey maintained that the
icltn paid the line.4 ' If this is true, it may be a breach of contract,
becausc the Standard Player Contract requires the player to pay such
tine. t
Excessive violence will continue so long as the pressure and motiva-
I lhe National I lockey League Standard Contract allows "termintion .. .at anN time...
it th,: pliser materially breaches his contract" (Clause 7B). operationally defined as. among
,ih'r things. "'being unfit to play hockey" (Clause 5).
lhe National Basketball Association clause allows termination if "in the sole opinion of
fhe Club's nuitttcment [the Plaver does notj exhibit sulicient skill or competitive ability to
•Au;!hiN ti continue as a member of the Club's team" IClause 20(b)(2)1. HORROW. supra note
6.. at 54. n.240.
't. th Rkot '," ra note 6, at 54.
Coftidential pla',er surveys (received by the author on February 15. 1979 and February 21.
Blet inard Parrish. lornier defensive star with the Cleveland Browns. suggests in his book. 1The
1' // .4 6,amn. that he %%as blacklisted because of his activities with the NFL Player's Asso-
t'tin artd wt,i shunned by fellow players for being a "clubhouse lawyer." B. PARRISH.
,r, note 33. at 172.
IS h o Iw., _supra note 6. at 59-60.
10 Note. .4 ',1 ,t,/ootball Plaver A.-unes the RivA' oReceivzng a Blow. Delivered Out of
In ,er am/tl rut-trat on But i thout Soet'ic Intent to Injure During a Game. 12 GA. L. Ri.v.
3S, 1, 978). I hereinafter cited as Note]
ti ('.;idcntial plaxer wu:veN (received by the author on February 22, 1979).
41 Contidential plaer ,urse,, (received by the author on FebruarY 15. 1979).
,2. National tlocke League Standard Player Contract. Clause 18: "The Club and the Player
turther agree that all tines imposed upon the Player under the Playing Rules or under ihe
pro% is,,on, off ihe League B,-Laws. shall be deducted from the salary of the player and be
iniitted hy the (Club to the NtIL Players Emergency Fund." "In basketball, the NBA Uni-
fotr I Pla'eis Contract. Clause 15. requires the player to promise to pay the fine directly, with
the C.luh" deducting it from his salary only if he fails to so pay." HORROW. suipra note 6. at
-:6. -1.321,
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tion to be violent remains. The sports establishment will not ade-
quately police itself until it is sufficiently motivated by outside forces.
As such, the burden of dealing with sports violence rests upon the court
system.
THE COURTS CANNOT RESOLVE THE PROBLEM UNTIL THEY
CLEARLY DRAW THE LINE SEPARATING LEGITIMATE,
AGGRESSIVE PLAY FROM EXCESSIVE,
ILLEGAL CONDUCT
Despite efforts to keep sports violence cases out of the court system,
an increasing number of cases are being litigated. Laws prohibiting
battery provide the civil and criminal justice systems with the power to
deal with excessive sports violence. Because the law in this area is am-
biguous and divergent, any sports violence case has significant prece-
dential value. To aid judicial resolution of egregious sports violence
cases, it is important to explore the elements of both the action and the
defenses.
Battery and the Problem of Establishing Intent
The common law defines battery as an act by a defendant with the
intent to inflict harmful or offensive touching, and a harmful or offen-
sive contact results. 3 As the definition suggests, plaintiff must prove
the defendant either intended the act or intended the bodily harm. In
either case, intent is not only the most decisive element, but, for several
reasons, it is also the most difficult element to prove in a sports-related
context. First, the objective indications available to evaluate the
mental state of the defendant participant are limited." Second, the as-
saulting athlete may not possess the requisite mens rea. Third, because
prospective jurors often view physical intimidation as just part of the
game,45 it is difficult to prove the athlete in fact intended to harm his
opponent. These obstacles are not insurmountable, they merely sug-
gest that only in exceptionally severe incidents is it wise to pursue a
judicial resolution.
The Assumption of the Risk Defense
Assumption of the risk means the plaintiff has consented in advance
to relieve the defendant of an obligation toward him. The plaintiff fur-
ther consents to take his chances of injury from a known risk arising
from what the defendant is to do or leave undone. 6 Thus an athlete
assumes the inherent dangers of the game and is precluded from recov-
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 13 (1965). See also PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THI"
LAW OF TORTS § 9 (4th ed. 1971).
44. Note, Tort Liabiliy in Professional Sports: Battle in the Sports Arena, 57 NEB. L. REV. 1128.
1134 (1978), [hereinafter cited as Tort Liability].
45. Smith, supra note 12, at 76.
46. PROSSER, supra note 43, at § 68, p. 440.
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ery for game-related injuries. An athlete does not, however, assume the
extraordinary risks of the game unless he knows of them and volun-
tarily assents to them.47 Thus courts are forced to adopt a case-by-case
approach in deciding what risks are foreseeable or inherent in that par-
ticular sport.
Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals48 is the leading assumption of the
risk case in football. It arose from a 1973 incident in which Cincinnati
Bengal fullback Charles "Booby" Clark struck Denver Bronco safety
Dale Hackbart in the back of the head five seconds after an intercep-
tion was whistled dead. Hackbart's professional career was effectively
ended. The blow resulted in three broken vertebrae, muscular atrophy
in Hackbart's arm, shoulder, and back, and a loss of strength and reflex
in his arm. The trial court ruled that Hackbart had assumed the risk of
such a blow. On appeal the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that
Hackbart indeed could sue for damages and that the Cincinnati Ben-
gals football team could be held accountable. In reversing and re-
manding the case, Judge Doyle emphasized that Clark's hit had been
intentional and was specifically prohibited by NFL rules. As such, it
could not have been an inherent part of the game and Hackbart could
not have assumed the risk.
In baseball the leading assumption of the risk case is Bourque v.
Duplechin4" which involved an adult-league amateur softball game.
The plaintiff, a second baseman, sued for negligence when a member of
the opposing team, while running from first to second base, ran outside
the baseline to hit the plaintiff. The Louisiana Court of Appeals found
that the defendant "was under a duty to play softball in the ordinary
fashion without unsportsmanlike conduct or wanton injury to his fel-
low players."5 The defendant breached this duty; his "behavior was,
according to the evidence, substandard and negligent."'" The court
stated that the second baseman may have assumed the risk of being
spiked while standing near the base, but did not assume the risk of
contact so far away from the base as to be violative of the duty to play
the game in the ordinary manner. 2 Dicta in the case appears applica-
ble to all professional sports:
A participant in a game or sport assumes all of the risks incidental
to that particular activity which are obvious and forseeable. A partici-
pant does not assume the risk of injury from fellow players acting in an
unexpected or unsportsmanlike way with a reckless lack of concern for
others participating (emphasis added).53
47. Id.
48. 435 F. Supp. 352 (D. Colo. 1977), rev'd, 601 F. 2d 516 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
931 (1979).
49, Bourque v. Duplechin, 331 So. 2d 40 (La. App. 1976).
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The Consent Defense
A defendant's most productive defense is "athletes willingly consent
to all contact incident to the game." The case law in this area is ex-
tremely unclear because the elements of consent vary among jurisdic-
tions. The defense was first recognized in a criminal assault case, Rex v.
Donovan." The Court of King's Bench stated that sports was one of
the well established exceptions to the general rule that an act likely to
cause or intended to cause bodily harm is an unlawful act.55 While
some jurisdictions have attempted to deal with such incidents on a
case-by-case basis, others have attempted to develop rational tests for
the application of the consent defense to sports violence cases.
Scope-of-consent test. This test implies that although players con-
sent to participation in the game, they do not consent to conduct that
exceeds a certain level of violence. Dean Prosser states that "[tihe de-
fendant's privilege is limited to the conduct to which the plaintiff con-
sents, or at least to acts of a substantially similar nature."56 Players
consent to physical contact that is generally and appropriately incident
to the game. Thus, defendant must show that the allegedly improper
conduct occurred during the normal flow of the game. In deciding this
issue, the trier of fact should consider whether the sport was contact
and whether the action was of a type reasonably expected to occur dur-
ing the course of the game.57 Under this test, if athletes do not engage
in intentional conduct that is markedly different from that which the
plaintiff apparently consented to, they will not be liable in battery for
resultant accidental injuries.
Rules-of-the-game test. Section 50 of the Second Restatement of
Torts provides the best definition of this test.5 8 Taking part in a game
manifests a willingness to submit to such bodily contacts as the rules
permit. Participating, however, does not manifest consent to contacts
which are prohibited by such rules if those rules were designed to pro-
tect the participants. The leading American case adopting a strict inter-
pretation of the rules-of-the-game test is Nabozny v. Barnhil.59 During
the course of a soccer game, the defendant, a forward, kicked the plain-
tiff goalkeeper in the head while he was in the penalty area. The goal-
keeper sustained serious head injuries. The game's organizational rules
prohibited contact with a goalkeeper in the penalty area. In attempting
to enunciate a principle applicable to all sports violence cases, the Illi-
nois Court of Appeals stated that:
54. 2 K.B. 498 (1934).
55. Id. at 508.
56. PROSSER, supra note 43, at § 18, p. 103.
57. Note, Criminal Law: Consent as a Defense to Criminal Battery--4he Problem of Athletic Con-
tests, 28 OKLA. L. REV. 840, 845 (1978).
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 50, Comment 6 (1965).
59. 31 111. App. 3d 212, 334 N.E.2d 258 (1975).
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when athletes are engaged in an athletic competition; all teams in-
volved are trained and coached by knowledgeable personnel; a recog-
nized set of rules governs the conduct of the competition; and a safety
rule is contained therein which is primarily designed to protect players
from serious injury, a player is then charged with a legal duty to every
other player on the field to refrain from conduct proscribed by a safety
rule.'
'llagnitude-qf-the-act est. This test implies that athletes consent to rea-
sonable actions of other players, regardless of whether the action was
within the scope of the rules. The Provincial Court of Ottawa, Ontario,
adopted the reasonableness standard in Regina v. Maki.6 The judge
maintained that a player does not consent to being maliciously attacked
with a hockey stick. The commission of such an act is not part of the
game.
6 2
Magnitude-qf-the-harm test. This test suggests that athletes consent
only to those acts that are "reasonably foreseeable" when they enter the
game. The goal of this standard is to "specifically provide a defense to
criminal prosecution whenever the injury inflicted or risked is a 'rea-
sonably foreseeable hazard' of a sports competition."63 This test, how-
ever, is not the definitive solution to the problem. Because of the
pressures previously described, an athlete may enter a game with
knowledge of potential harm, but be powerless to do anything about it.
Surely he cannot be deemed to consent to exceptional violence merely
because he can foresee it.
E/fecireness-of-consent test. Some case law suggests that a victim's
consent may not be effective because he is powerless to waive interests
that the state has in controlling serious crime.' In State v. Fransua6 5
the Court of Appeals of New Mexico stated that:
Whether or not the victims of crimes have so little regard for their own
safety as to request injury, the public has a stronger and overriding
interest in preventing and prohibiting acts such as these. We hold that
consent is not a defense to the crime of aggravated battery, . . . irre-
spective of whether the victim invites the act and consents to the
battery.6t
The Provocation Defense
Because so few jurisdictions recognize this defense, the fact that the
6o, Id. at 260-61.
61. 14 Dorn. L. R. 3d 164 (1970). It is only dictum because Maki was acquitted not as a result of
his consent defense but because his act was considered to be in self-defense.
62. Id. at 167.
63. U.S. N.\IIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, WORKING PAPERS,
851 (1970).
64. For a discussion of this area, see Flechter, supra note 21 at 442-50.
65. 85 N.M. 173. 510 P.2d 106 (Ct. App. 1973).
66- 1I. at 107.
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defendant was provoked into retaliation may not be important in the
* sports violence context. In Agar v. Canning67 the Manitoba Court of
Queen's Bench held that "[ilnjuries inflicted in circumstances which
show a definite resolve to cause serious injury to another, even where
there is provocation," should give rise to liability.6" Furthermore, in
jurisdictions that do recognize this defense, provocation is only consid-
ered in the issue of mitigation, not in resolving guilt or innocence.' ' '
The Involuntary Reflex Defense
This defense was successfully employed in State v. Forbes.7" In
Forbes, a criminal case, it was argued that such violence is the product
of an involuntary reflex action and lacked the requisite mens rea.
There are a number of reasons for the success of this defense. Initially,
intent is a difficult element to prove, even without the reflex argument
as a complicating factor. 7' Next, sports violence is taught and accepted
by its participants as non-criminal from an early age. 72 Finally, given
the high pressured, emotional nature of professional sports, the atmos-
phere is conducive to a player losing control.7 3 Sports attorney Bob
Woolf, however, notes that the "heat of the game has always been a
kind of moral defense in sports to excuse bad manners and irrational
acts."74
Self-defense
An athlete who acts in self-defense against an unlawful attack is not
guilty of battery. Courts have fashioned the rule that a person who
finds himself assaulted may answer force with force in order to protect
a victim from injury as long as the apparent danger is present.7 5 For a
number of reasons, an athlete cannot rely upon self-defense in most
cases. First, the defendant is limited to force roughly equal to that used
against him. Self-defense is not a proper defense if the blow was un-
necessarily severe and vindicative rather than preventive. 76 The use of
excessive force may constitute an assault if it goes beyond that which is
necessary to repel the attacker. 77 Thus, where the response is more se-
vere than the initial contact, self-defense does not apply.
Another reason for the limited use of self-defense is that the rule
requires the absence of provocation on the part of the plaintiff. Also.
67. 54 W.W.R. 302 (Q.B.Man. 1965), a'd, 55 W.W.R. 384 (C.A. 1966).
68. Id. at 304.
69. Fraser v. Berkley, 7 Car & P. 621, 173 E.R. 272 (1836).
70. No. 63280 (Minn. Dist. Ct., 4th Jud. Dist.,judgment of mistrial entered, Aug. 12. 1975).
71. TORT LIABILITY. supra note 44, at 1134.
72. HORROW, supra note 6, at 25.
73. Note, supra note 39, at 387-88.
74. WOOLF, supra note 9, at 141.
75. Hechter. supra note 21, at 450.
76. Rex v. Kinman. 16 B.C. 148. 18 Canadian Crim. Cases 139 (C.A. 191 1)" Nvkoln r. the Kin,
94 Canadian Crim. Cases 145, 8 Crin. Reports 7 (1949).
77. Hechter, supra note 21, at 451.
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the plaintiff must have had reasonable grounds to have an actual and
honest belief that he was about to be placed in immediate danger of
great bodily harm.78 Finally, the athlete may use force only when re-
treating or avoiding the danger is unreasonable. Hence, when a player
has the option of walking away from a fight, self-defense will not ex-
cuse him if he chooses to stay and fight the opponent.
Respondeat Superior: Vicarious Liability and Agency Liability
Owners and coaches may be liable under respondeat superior, vica-
rious liability or a theory of principal and agent. If one recognizes the
pressures used to encourage conformity to the generally accepted stan-
dards of violent behavior, liability under one of these theories is plausi-
ble. Indeed, in Tomjanovich v. California Sports, Inc. " this is precisely
what happened. The suit arose out of an incident in which Los Angeles
Laker forward Kermit Washington hit Houston Rocket forward Rudy
Tomjanovich in the face after an on-court scuffle between Washington
and Houston player Kevin Kunnert. Tomjanovich alleged that Wash-
ington's punch was unnecessary and absolutely inexcusable. Citing
everything from fractures of the nose, jaw and skull to "impairment of
earning capacity and loss of business opportunities by way of promo-
tional fees and commercial endorsements," Tomjanovich asked for $2.6
million in total damages. On August 17, 1979, after two weeks of testi-
mony, the jury awarded Tomjanovich $1.8 million in actual damages
and $1.5 million in punitive damages for a total of $3.3 million,
$600,000 more than Tomjanovich asked for in his complaint.
The jury found basically that Washington committed a battery and
acted with "reckless disregard for the safety of others." The blow "was
not accidental or unintentional, but was an intentional act." The jury
also found the Los Angeles Lakers organization negligent for failing
"to adequately train and supervise" Washington after it became appar-
ent "that he had a tendency for violence while playing basketball."80
Almost as important is what the jury did not find: Washington did not
act in self-defense and "the blow struck by Washington was far beyond
any type of conduct permitted by the rules and customs of the game.
Tomjanovich did not consent to such conduct." After the jury decision,
the Houston Rockets' suit against the Los Angeles Lakers for lost busi-
ness and franchise value due to Tomjanovich's absence was settled out
of court.
78. Id.
7). Tomjanovich v. California Sports, Inc., No. CA H-78-243 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 1979); see 2
SPORrs L. RPTR. No. 4. 1 (1979).
80. Id. 4 SPORTs L. RPTR. No. 2, 6 (1981).
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LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPTS TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM OF
SPORTS VIOLENCE
The ambiguities and line-drawing in sports violence cases point up
the inadequacies of the civil and criminal justice system in these cases.
As case law indicates, a football player may be liable for something he
does on the field, yet a hockey player may not be liable for the same act
in the rink. A baseball player may be liable in Louisiana, but may not
be liable in Illinois. Much of the confusion stems from judges and ju-
ries interpreting laws which legislators did not write to cover cases of
sports violence.
State and local assault and battery laws have traditionally had little
usefulness in the area of professional sports violence. These laws, and
the judicial cases interpreting them, have focused on ordinary street
crime, and have proven almost irrelevant to the special circumstances
of mayhem on the field. A federal statute would have a deterrent ef-
fect, making professional sports safer for all participants, and would
also help players know the outer limits of acceptable conduct while
reducing peer and management pressure to use excessive violence to
injure or intimidate opposing players. Because of the inconsistent ap-
plication of these laws to professional sports, and because of the inter-
state nature of modern professional sports, a federal criminal statute
would be complementary to existing state and local laws."'
On July 31, 1980, Representative Ronald M. Mottl (D-Ohio)12 in-
troduced H.R. 7903, the Sports Violence Act of 1980.83 The bill would
have amended Chapter 7 of Title 18 of the United States Code and
would have made excessive violence by a player a criminal offense by
providing that:
[a] player in a professional sports event who knowingly uses excessive
physical force and thereby causes a risk of significant bodily injury to
another person involved in that event shall be fined not more than
$5000 or imprisoned not more than one year or both.
Excessive physical force is defined as "physical force that has no rea-
sonable relationship to the competitive goals of the sport, is unreasona-
bly violent; and could not be reasonably foreseen or was not consented
to by the injured person." The Act thus would have established a uni-
form national floor defining illegal conduct, and yet would have al-
lowed states to draft stricter legislation. Unfortunately, due to the
extensive lobbying efforts of the sports establishment, the bill did not
pass.
The bill was re-introduced in the Ninety-seventh Congress as H.R.
2263 with the support of former Buffalo Bills quarterback Jack Kemp
81. 126 CONG. REC. E3711 (daily ed. July 31, 1980) (prepared remarks of Rep. Mottl), [hereinaf-
ter cited as Mottl].
82. Congressman Mottl starred as a pitcher on the University of Notre Dame baseball team and
also played for the Philadelphia Phillies minor league farm club.
83. 126 CONG. REC. E3711 (daily ed. July 31, 1980) (prepared remarks of Rep. Mottl).
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(R-N.Y.). H.R. 2263 is identical to its predecessor H.R. 7903. It is now
being considered by the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime,
which recently completed hearings on the Bill with testimony from ath-
letes and officials from the four major professional sports leagues, soci-
ologists, legislators and attorneys specializing in sports law.
Representative Mottl also recently introduced H.R. 5079, the Sports
Violence Arbitration Act of 1981, which would require all major sports
leagues to establish an arbitration board that would create financial in-
centives for clubs and players to refrain from encouraging or engaging
in unnecessarily violent conduct. The board could impose fines upon a
club and hold the club financially liable for any unnecessarily violent
conduct of its players. The financial liability of a club would include
paying the salary of an injured player during the period of an injury,
paying the injured player's medical expenses, paying damages to the
injured player if he is prevented from playing in subsequent seasons,
and possibly paying damages or awarding a draft choice to the injured
player's club for failure to supervise excessively violent players.
The board could suspend without pay and impose fines on the
player who flagrantly violated the rules protecting players in competi-
tion, thereby risking injury in a manner that is unrelated to the compet-
itive goals of the sport. A grievance procedure, complete with an
evidentiary hearing, would be the vehicle of imposing punishment on
clubs and players. Thus, H.R. 5079 would impose civil penalties, com-
plementing the criminal penalties of H.R. 2263.
Federal statutes such as these would preserve the vitality of profes-
sional sports, while serving notice on athletes that they have no license
to commit unwarranted acts of assault and battery. 4 This statute
would draw the line between legitimate, aggressive behavior and exces-
sive. illegal conduct. The sincere threat of criminal prosecution, by de-
terring the most extreme acts of sports violence, would make sports
safer for the participants. 8 Only those players who violate the law
would be prosecuted, those who obey the law need not worry about
prosecution. 6 Third, such legislation would "symbolically confirm
that fundamental law and order do not stop at the ticket gate. '  Fi-
nally, punishment of excessive violence would "set an example for
young people who look to professional athletes as role models for their
own behavior.""8
PROPOSAL FOR FEDERAL SPORTS AGENCY
Another solution to this and other sports problems would be the
84. Sproizer. iolence in Professional.Sports. A Needfor Federal Regulation. 33 CASE AND CONI-
Nwi T 3. 6. 8 (Max-June 1981).
85. 126 CoNo. REc. E3711 (daily ed. July 31, 1980) (prepared remarks of Rep. Mottl).
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creation of a governmental sports agency that would have the power to
oversee and regulate all aspects of sports. Though the mechanics of
such an agency may be debated, the advantages are worth noting.
First, the problem of distinguishing individual liability from sports lia-
bility would be less important when the sports institution, through reg-
ulatory guidance, ceases to promote or tolerate questionable activity.8"
Second, the difficulties of defining appropriate conduct would be re-
duced by forming a regulatory board composed of knowledgeable rep-
resentatives of the sport itself and other sports-related fields.9 ° Third,
an agency could impose uniform national regulation and avoid judicial
inconsistency.9 Fourth, even if civil or criminal sanctions would suf-
fice under normal circumstances, the agency could provide additional
deterrent effect by imposing further sanctions on the team for its
player's violation.9" Fifth, the public policy issues and current ambigu-
ities could be confronted more effectively and justly through legislative
and administrative action.93
Furthermore, there are additional spin-off advantages that flow
from administrative regulation in this context. Such an approach
would be similar to the situation long established for other occupations,
most notably the professions, and would be a long overdue recognition
of sports as a business enterprise.94 Additionally, establishment of a
federal agency would reduce the pressures on athletes to keep sports




Realistically, there are a number of significant problems in litigat-
ing sports violence cases. But the courts must stand ready to intervene
despite the problems, when an act of violence is excessively brutal oi
when the league's fine or suspension is not severe enough to deter fur.
ther incidents. The Sports Violence Act would provide a uniform na.
tional standard for judicial resolution of sports violence cases., and
federal sports agency would provide the needed enforcement mecha
nism. However we ultimately decide to control the problem of sport:
violence, something must be done as rapidly as possible, or we risl
further deterioration of the sports so valued by American society.
89. Id.






95. Discipline, supra note 28, at 795.
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